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Miller: Search and Seizure

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FOURTH DEPARTMENT
People v. Park'
(decided May 3, 2002)
Jung Park, Jr. pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the third degree. 2 However, Park appealed
his conviction and argued that the stop of his vehicle for failure to
wear a seatbelt was a pretext to conduct a narcotics investigation.3
Thus, Park asserted the initial stop was in violation of the Fourth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution4 and Article 1, Section 12
of the New York State Constitution, 5 and therefore, the evidence
seized should be suppressed. 6 However, the appellate division
rejected Park's contentions and affirmed his conviction.7
While driving his vehicle, Park was stopped by the police
for violating the traffic code. Prior to this encounter, the Vice
Squad observed the defendant's car at a house that was under
'294 A.D.2d 887, 741 N.Y.S.2d 824 (4th Dep't 2002).
2 Id. at 887, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 825; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.16
(McKinney 2002) which states in pertinent part:
Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third
degree-A person is guilty of criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the third degree when he knowingly
and unlawfully possesses: (1) A narcotic drug with intent to
sell it; ... Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the
third degree is a class B felony.
3 Park,294 A.D.2d at 888, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides in pertinent part: "the right of the people
to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated ......
5 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 provides in pertinent part: "the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, papers, houses, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures .... "
6Park, 294 A.D.2d at 888, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
7
d. at 888, 41 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
8N.Y. VEH & TRAF. LAW § 1229-c (3) (McKinney 2002) states:
Operation of vehicles with safety seats and safety belts---(3)
No person shall operate a motor vehicle unless such person is
restrained by a safety belt approved by the commissioner. No
person sixteen years of age or over shall be a passenger in the
front seat of a motor vehicle unless such person is restrained
by a safety belt approved by the commissioner.
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surveillance for drug activities. 9 This information was relayed to
the officer, who stopped Park and his passenger for violating
Section 1229-c (3) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law for failing to
wear their seatbelts.' 0 The officer asked Park whether "[Park] had
a gun or 'anything' else on him."'" Park then offered the officer
marijuana.' 2 As a result, Park was arrested for unlawful possession
of drugs and the officer conducted a search, which led to the
discovery of cocaine. 13 The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty
to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third
degree. 14
The defendant appealed, arguing that the seized narcotics
should have been suppressed.1 5 Although the defendant conceded
that there Was probable cause to stop his vehicle, he argued that the
primary reason the officer stopped his vehicle was to perform an
investigatory search. 16 Park therefore concluded that the officer's
pretextual motives violated both his Federal and New York State
17
Constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The appellate division held the initial stop was
constitutional based upon the New York Court of Appeals recent
adoption of the federal standard in People v. Robinson. 18 In
People v. Robinson, the court followed Whren v. United States,19
which held that when an officer has probable cause to believe a
defendant has violated the traffic code, the stop is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, and all evidence discovered during the
stop and incident to the arrest is admissible. 20 Accordingly, Article
I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution, which prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures, would also not be violated
"where a police officer has probable cause to believe that the
' Park,294 A.D.2d at 888, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
10Id.
12 Id.
13id.
14

Park, 294 A.D.2d at 888, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 825.

15Id.
16 id.

17 id.
I 97 N.Y.2d 341, 765 N.E.2d 844, 739 N.Y.S.2d 147 (2001).
'9 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
20
Id. at 819.
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driver of an automobile has committed a traffic violation, even
though the officer
may have used the stop as a pretext for
2'
else."
something
The appellate division explained there was no dispute that
Park and his passenger violated Vehicle and Traffic Law Section
1229-c (3) seatbelt requirement.2 2 Thus, the initial stop was
proper.23 Furthermore, the information given to the officer by the
Vice Squad regarding its observance of the defendant's vehicle
provided the officer with "a 'founded suspicion that criminality
was afoot." 24 This information created reasonable suspicion and
provided the basis for the officer questioning the defendant
regarding weapons. 25 In addition, the cocaine was discovered in a
search incident to an arrest because the defendant had been
arrested for unlawful possession prior to the officer conducting the
search. 26 Consequently, Park's arguments regarding the officer's
pretextual motivation for making the traffic stop and the
subsequent finding of cocaine, which led to Park's arrest, were all
foreclosed with respect to any invalidation on constitutional
grounds as being reasonably dependent on the actual motivations
of the individual officer in conducting the stop itself.27 Lastly, the
court opined that Park spoke freely to the officers, "waiving his
Miranda28 rights., 29 Thus, the court held although the officers
2 Park, 294 A.D.2d at 888, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 825 (quoting Robinson, 97

N.Y.2d at 349, 765 N.E.2d at 642, 739 N.Y.2d at 151).
22 Id.
23 id.

Id. (quoting People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 191, 590 N.E.2d 204, 210,
581 N.Y.S.2d 619, 625 (1992)).
24

25

id.

26

Park, 294 A.D.2d at 888, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 825.

27

Id.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966). Miranda holds that a
defendant must be warned before any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, and that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law. Id. A
defendant must also be told that he has the right to an attorney, and if he cannot
afford one, one will be appointed for him (prior to any questioning, if he so
desires). Id. Once a defendant has been read his Miranda rights, a defendant
may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer
questions or make a statement. Id. at 474. However, the evidence obtained as a
result of interrogation will be used against him at trial, unless it is shown that the
defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive these rights. Id. at 476. To
constitute an effective waiver, the accused must have been offered counsel, but
28
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discussed Park's options if he cooperated, they did not promise
Park that he would be treated leniently. The court therefore
30
affirmed the lower court's ruling.
The United States Supreme Court in Whren v. United States
held that the Fourth Amendment controls an officer's stop of an
automobile. 3 1 Therefore, the stop must not be unreasonable and
probable cause must exist to believe that a traffic violation has
occurred.32 The Court additionally explained that a search incident
to an arrest is not rendered invalid because an officer uses a traffic
violation as a ploy to conduct a narcotics search.33 Therefore,
"subjective intent alone does not make an otherwise lawful arrest
invalid or unconstitutional and plays no role in ordinary, probable
34
cause Fourth Amendment analysis."
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals in People v.
Robinson35 held that an officer has effectuated a reasonable basis
to make a stop once the officer is able to articulate material facts to
establish reasonable cause for believing that someone has violated
a law. 36 In Robinson, the defendant was a passenger in a taxicab,
which the police officers observed speeding through a red light.37
The officers, after stopping the taxicab, noticed the defendant was
wearing a bulletproof vest and that a gun was lying on the floor
under the defendant's seat. 38 Robinson was arrested and charged
with criminal possession of a weapon and unlawfully wearing a
bulletproof vest. 39 Robinson argued the evidence should be
suppressed because the officers used a traffic infraction as a pretext
to search the taxicab, and such a search violated the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1,
intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Id. at 475.

Presuming

waiver from a silent record is impermissible. Id.
29
30

Park, 294 A.D.2d at 887, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 825.

id.

31Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
32

id.

33

1Id.at 812.
34
Id.at 813.
31 97 N.Y.2d at 341, 767 N.E.2d at 638, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
36

Id. at 353, 767 N.E.2d at 645, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 154.

3 Id. at 346, 767 N.E.2d at 640, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
3
39

Id. at 346-47, 767 N.E.2d at 640, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
Id.
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Section 12 of the New York Constitution. 40 In Robinson, the New
York Court of Appeals adopted the standard articulated by the
Supreme Court in Whren v. United States and explained that once
an officer establishes probable cause to temporarily stop an
individual for a traffic violation, the seizure does not constitute a
violation of Article 1, Section 12 of the New York State
Constitution, even where the officers' acts are based upon a
pretextual motivation. 4 1 The Robinson court additionally espoused
that determinations of neither the officers' primary motivation or
"what a reasonable traffic officer would have done under the
circumstances is relevant ' A2 and noted that it has never held that a
pretextual stop was violative of Article I, Section 12. Moreover,
the court explained that the protections of Article I, Section 12 of
the New York State Constitution beyond those of the Federal
Constitution have not been dependent upon challenging police
authority to act when a law or regulation had been violated and
probable cause existed for the officer to make a stop that
subsequently led to an arrest. 4
In People v. Holloman the New York Court of Appeals
explained that the New York law regarding if an officer acts
properly in initiating contact with the defendant prior to his
arrest. 4 The four-part "De Bour method ' 46 states:
If a police officer seeks simply to request
information from an individual, that request must be
supported by an objective, credible reason, not
necessarily indicative of criminality. The commonlaw right of inquiry, a wholly separate level of
contact, is activated by a founded suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot and permits a somewhat
greater intrusion. Where a police officer has
reasonable suspicion that a particular person was
involved in a felony or misdemeanor, the officer is
40

Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 347, 767 N.E.2d at 640, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
767 N.E.2d at 642, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 151.

41 Id. at 349,
42 Id.
43 id.
44 Id. at 351,

767 N.E.2d at 643, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
45 Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d at 184, 590 N.E.2d at 205, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
46 De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 220, 352 N.E.2d at 569, 386 N.Y.S. at 381.
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authorized to forcibly stop and detain that person.
Finally, where the officer has probable cause to
believe that a person has committed a crime, an
arrest is authorized.47
In Hollman, an undercover officer at a bus terminal
observed the defendant carrying an orange bag and looking
around.48 The defendant then went up the escalator, and later came
down the escalator with a companion who carried a black
knapsack.49 Hollman and his companion boarded a bus fifteen
minutes later. 50 The officer approached the defendant after he
observed the defendant place the two bags in the overhead bins, a
few seats ahead of where they were seated. 5 ' The officer identified
himself as a narcotics officer and requested permission to question
the men. After being informed the bags did not belong to anyone
on the bus and that the two defendants were not traveling together,
the officer searched the bags. 52 During the search, the officer
found crack cocaine in one of the bags and empty vials and white
powder in the other knapsack.53 The officer placed Hollman under
arrest for the unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the
criminal use of drug paraphernalia and the endangerment of a
child's welfare. 54 The trial court found that the officer's
observations provided him with reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity was afoot, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed.55
The New York Court of Appeals explained that the De
Bour test, which relates to an officer who is engaged in his official
criminal law enforcement capacity, means that a "policeman's
right to request information while discharging his law enforcement
duties will hinge on the manner and intensity of the interference,
the gravity of the crime involved and the circumstances attending
the encounter." 56 Therefore, a police officer is allowed in his
41
48

Id. at 185,590 N.E.2d at 206, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d at 185, 590 N.E.2d at 206, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 621.

49 Id.

5oId.

S

Id. at 186, 590 N.E.2d at 206, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 621.

52 Id.

" Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d at 186, 590 N.E.2d at 210, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
54 Id.

55 id.
56
Id.at 189, 590 N.E.2d 208, 581 N.Y.S.2d 623.
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official capacity as a law enforcement officer to require a person to
answer questions relating to identity or destination, so long as the
officer is acting within reasonable limits in approaching the
57
individual and not acting whimsically or in a capricious fashion.
As the court further reasoned, the distinction rests on the "content
of the questions, the number of questions asked, and the degree to
which the language and nature of the questions transform the
58
encounter from a merely unsettling one to an intimidating one.',
Based upon this analysis, the court affirmed Hollman's conviction.
Similar to the defendant Hollman, Jung Park, Jr. was
approached by an officer and questioned about illegal activity.
However, Park was stopped for a traffic infraction, not suspicious
behavior. Based on the information that the officer received from
the Vice Squad, reasonable suspicion that criminality was afoot
was established. 59 Therefore, according to the De Bour test, the
officer was well within his right to engage in a higher degree of
intrusion inherent in the common-law inquiry.
Moreover, once
Park offered the officer marijuana, probable cause to arrest
Park
6
and to conduct a search incident to an arrest was present. 1
Generally, the New York courts apply the federal standard
recently adopted in Robinson,62 however the employment of the De
Bour method is still used to initially determine whether an officer
acted reasonably in stopping the suspect. 63 As the New York
Court of Appeals explained in Hollman, there is a common-law
right of inquiry that law enforcement officers have based upon a
" Id. at 190-91, 590 N.E.2d at 209, 581 N.Y.2d at 624.
58

Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d at 192, 590 N.E.2d at 210, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 625.

'9Park,294 A.D.2d at 888, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
60 Id. In Hollman, the court explained the difference between a request for
information and a common-law inquiry. The court stated the difference rests
upon the types of questions posed by the officer (the tone and focus of the
inquiry), the answers received to the officer's questions, whether the officer has

any concrete indication that criminality is afoot and whether the person being
questioned believes that he is being suspected of some criminal activity. Id. at
191, 590 N.E.2d at 210, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 625. See also, People v. Moore, 47
N.Y.2d 911, 393 N.E.2d 489, 419 N.Y.S.2d 495 (1979); People v. Cantor, 36
N.Y.2d 106, 324 N.E.2d 872, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1975); People v. Rosemond,
26 N.Y.2d 101, 104, 257 N.E.2d 23, 25, 308 N.Y.S.2d 836, 838 (1970).
61 Park,294 A.D.2d at 888, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
62 Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 341, 767 N.E.2d at 638, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
63 Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d at 190, 590 N.E.2d at 209, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 624.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [2014], Art. 17

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 19

suspicion that is indicative of criminality being afoot when acting
as public servants.64 Whereas, the federal courts strictly employ
the Whren standard in assessing the reasonableness of an officer's
conduct in stopping an individual, neither the federal nor New
York State courts take into account an officer's motives for making
the stop, so long as the officer had probable cause to believe that
the defendant had violated the law. It is the officer's subsequent
conduct after making the stop that is assessed in determining
whether Article 1, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution
has been violated.65
Based on the aforementioned analysis, it can be concluded
that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and
Article 1, Section 12 of the New York Constitution are identical
and afford the same protections with respect to the stop of an
automobile for a traffic infraction. Both clauses provide citizens
with protection from unreasonable searches and seizures.

Marcia Miller

64
65

Id. at 191, 590 N.E.2d at 210, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 350, 767 N.E.2d at 638, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
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